

CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~

25X1A

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

REPORT NO. [REDACTED]

INFORMATION REPORT

CD NO.

COUNTRY China

CONFIDENTIAL

DATE DISTR. 19 April 1949

SUBJECT Collapse of Nationalist Plan for Defense of Yangtze

NO. OF PAGES

PLACE 25X1A

Retain or DestroyNO. OF ENCLS.
(LISTED BELOW)

ACQUIRED [REDACTED]

DATE OF IN [REDACTED]

SUPPLEMENT TO
REPORT NO.

25X1X

THE FOLLOWING REPORT WAS PREVIOUSLY

DISTRIBUTED AS "CIA PRELIMINARY

25X1A

OR DISSEMINATION NUMBERED OUT [REDACTED]

1. Generalissimo CHIANG Kai-shek has rendered ineffective a Nationalist plan (outlined in paragraph 4) for the defense of the Yangtze River. This circumstance, brought about through the personal loyalty to the Generalissimo of the Chinese Navy and Air Force, virtually nullifies the Nationalist capability to resist a Communist crossing.
2. The Navy and Air Force, which are partially paid by CHIANG, have always been uncooperative and now have largely been deployed to Taiwan.
3. The final blow was the pulling of TANG En-po's troops and materiel back to Shanghai, not to defend the city, but to be evacuated to Taiwan if the Communists menace the area.
4. The Nationalist defense plan was to allow the Communists to gain bridgeheads on the south bank of the Yangtze, then cut the bridgeheads off from the main Communist forces by coordinated ground, air and naval fire, and destroy them. There are only nine points where crossings would allow the Communists to exploit the road net on the south bank, and these places are easy to defend. Available Nationalist forces were completely adequate to carry out the above plan. [REDACTED] the destruction of Communist boats alone by such a plan would have delayed the Communists at least two or three months, and that the propaganda effect of such a costly setback might have been crucial for the Communists at this time.
5. The Communist ultimatum (brought to Nanking on 16 April 1949 by HUANG Shao-hsiung), setting 20 April as the date for the Communist crossing, leaves the Nationalists only to choose whether or not the crossing will be opposed. The government has determined to refuse the Communist demand and contest the crossing. However, the main Communist strength is concentrated against

25X1X

CONFIDENTIAL

Document No. [REDACTED]
 NO CHANGE in Class. ☐
 X RECLASSIFIED
 Class. CHANGED TO: TS S C

CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~

STATE	#	NAVY	NSRB	DISTRIBUTION	DDA Memo, 4 Apr 77
ARMY					Auth: DDA REG. 77/1783

This document is hereby reclassified to
 CONFIDENTIAL in accordance with the
 letter of 16 October 1978 from the
 Director of Central Intelligence to the
 Archivist of the United States.

Date: 15 MAY 78 By: 018

BY CABLE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

- 2 -

TANG En-po's sector, with no push planned against PAI Chung-hsi's sector. With the withdrawal of TANG's troops, there can be no effective Nationalist resistance.

6. Clearly the Communist military aim is to drive straight through to Hangchow. They have set ten places as crossing points, including Chenchiang, Chiangyin and eight points in Anhwei. Nationalist General LIU Ju-ming, who commands eight hundred li between Poyang Lake and Huaining, is an old FENG Yu-hsiang man and is undependable.

CONFIDENTIAL

~~SECRET~~